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Research investigating risk preference has pointed towards motivation and ability as important 
factors for determining the strength and likelihood of the framing effect. In the current study we 
explored the influence of individual differences in motivation and ability through circadian 
rhythm.  We predicted that during circadian off-times participants would exhibit stronger 
framing effects whereas framing effects would be relatively weaker during on-times.  Six-
hundred and eighty five individuals took part in the study; the findings supported our hypothesis, 
revealing a diurnal pattern of risk responding that varies across the 24-hour circadian cycle. 
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  What underlies risky choice is of particular importance to society and fascination to those 
seeking to understand rationality.  Not surprisingly, a great deal of research has focused on 
factors that influence the risk a person is willing to accept in a given situation.  Gaining a better 
understanding of factors that influence risk preference increases our understanding of 
psychological processes and can aid in better decision making.   
   The most studied examples of risk and decision making revolve around the framing 
effect.  The framing effect is derived from prospect theory predictions (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979) and has become one of the foremost studied examples of rational decision making.  
According to prospect theory, the presentation of an outcome as either a loss or gain affects the 
amount of risk a person is willing to accept.  This effect is due to differences in perceived 
subjective value and is captured by the S-shaped value function.  This function is concave for 
gains, which leads to risk-averse preferences, and convex for losses, which leads to preference 
for risky alternatives.   
  In what has become the most well known example of the framing effect, participants read 
of an Asian disease that will potentially kill 600 people (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).  The 
participant is then asked to choose between two alternatives for dealing with the disease.  One 
alternative contains a certain outcome (e.g., 200 people saved for certain) and the other has a 
stated likelihood for an outcome (e.g., A 1/3 probability that all 600 people will be saved and a 
2/3 probability that no one will be saved).  The alternatives are presented either positively 
(people saved) or negatively (people die).  Importantly, both of the alternatives contain exactly 
the same “expected outcome”, or numerical magnitude.  As decades of research have shown, THOUGHTFUL DAYS AND VALENCED NIGHTS 4 
 
people tend to choose the certain/risk free option when the problem is framed positively and the 
risky option when it is framed negatively.  
  While the framing effect has proved enduring, a number of studies have pointed toward 
motivation and ability as key factors for determining the strength of the framing effect.  One of 
the most widely investigated personality factors in framing research is need-for-cognition (NFC).  
This personality trait reflects the extent to which people engage in effortful thought and how 
much they enjoy doing so.  Thus, individuals with high levels of NFC should process tasks more 
effortfully whereas individuals low in this trait should use less effort.  Research has shown that 
framing effects are lessened for individuals who are high in NFC (e.g., Chatterjee, Heath, 
Milberg & France, 2000; Curseu, 2006; Smith & Levin, 1996; Zhang & Buda, 1999).  Similar 
findings were revealed in a paper by Simon, Fagley and Halleran (2004) when high NFC was 
combined with math ability or depth of processing.   
Related research has also directly manipulated motivation and observed the effects on 
framing and decision choice (e.g.,  Biswas, 2009; Igou & Bless, 2007; Leny-Meyers & 
Maheswaran, 2004; McElroy & Seta, 2003; McElroy & Mascari, 2007). Based in classic dual- 
process models in social psychology (e.g., Chaiken, 1987; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), these 
studies manipulate motivation by presenting a task that is either high or low in personal 
importance, which should lead to more or less effortful processing respectively.  Overall, the 
findings from these studies reveal that when high levels of motivation for the task are introduced, 
the framing effect is attenuated, with one exception (Igou & Bless, 2007).  In a somewhat similar 
approach, research from fuzzy-trace theory (Reyna & Brainerd, 1991) has shown that when THOUGHTFUL DAYS AND VALENCED NIGHTS 5 
 
greater “gist like” memory retrieval is used framing effects are robust whereas when the more 
precise “verbatim” retrieval is relied on framing effects are less evident.  
   One ability factor that has been identified is numeracy, which refers to the propensity to 
integrate complex numeric information.  Research (Peters & Levin, 2008; Peters et al., 2006) has 
shown that low numerate individuals respond more superficially to non-numeric sources of 
information (i.e., frame) and consequently, they have been shown to demonstrate stronger 
framing effects (for review see Reyna, Nelson, Han, Paul & Dieckmann, 2009).  In an 
Investigation of another individual difference variable, Frederick (2005) examined how 
individual differences in the Cognitive Reflection Test, a measure correlated with cognitive 
ability, interacted with framing effects.  Frederick found that for individuals scoring high on this 
measure, framing effects were attenuated.  Similar findings were reported by Oechssler, Roider, 
&  Schmitz (2009). 
Other research has also shown evidence for ability.  In one study Stanovich and West 
(1998) found that individuals high in cognitive ability, as measured by SAT scores, were less 
likely to exhibit framing effects.  Stanovich and West (2000) suggest that individuals with high 
levels of cognitive ability are better able to integrate and thereby recognize the numerical 
equality present in the alternatives.  However, later research seems to call this into question 
(Stanovich & West, 2008).   
  Taken together, these studies point toward a general social psychological perspective for 
understanding how motivation and ability influences effort.  The basic assumption underlying 
most of these approaches and investigations is that motivation and ability are determining factors THOUGHTFUL DAYS AND VALENCED NIGHTS 6 
 
for when a person is likely to process a decision task with more or less effort.  And as a 
consequence of effortful processing, framing effects will be more or less likely to occur.  One 
way that humans vary in motivation and ability is diurnally, in a cyclic pattern known as 
circadian rhythm. 
Circadian typology. 
    Circadian rhythm reflects variations in our diurnal patterns that are relatively stable 
(e.g., Sverko & Fabulic, 1985) and independent of both the sleep–wake cycle and body 
temperature (Folkard, Hume, Minors, Waterhouse, & Watson, 1985).  A number of biological 
and psychological factors vary in accordance with our daily biological rhythm, including effort 
and ability.  The findings in this area show that during “on times” (e.g., 10:00 a.m.) people 
perform tasks with more cognitive effort relative to “off times” (e.g., 3:00 a.m.) (e.g., Martin & 
Marrington, 2005; Monk & Leng, 1986).   
  Further research has shown that when cognitive resources are attenuated due to circadian 
mismatch, there is greater reliance on judgmental heuristics (Bodenhausen, 1990).  For example, 
in two studies Bodenhausen showed that processing strategies had predictable diurnally patterns 
with morning types relying more on heuristics for stereotype judgments during evening hours 
when their motivation and ability was lower and evening types relying more on stereotype 
judgments during morning hours when motivation and ability was lessened. Related findings 
were reported by Kruglanski and Pierro (2008), showing that circadian mismatched persons 
showed more transference effects, an indication of social schemata activation.   
 
Predictions. THOUGHTFUL DAYS AND VALENCED NIGHTS 7 
 
  Prior research shows that both motivation and ability influence the likelihood of framing 
effects and one way people vary is circadian rhythm.  In the current study we examined whether 
circadian rhythm variation can influence reliance on the frame and, in turn, risk preference.  We 
manipulated the time-of-day that participants completed a framing task and observed differences 
in their level of risky response.  We predicted that framing effects should be stronger when 
participants performed tasks during “off time” hours relative to “on times”.    
Method 
Participants and Design 
  Six-hundred and eighty five individuals including 402 females and 282 males took part in 
the study; the average age of our participants was 23.3.  Participants were students recruited via 
email for each 24-hour time slot.  The design of our study was a 2 (off time, on time) x 2 (gain, 
loss) between subjects design.  Participants reported risk preference was our dependent variable.  
 
Procedure and Materials 
  A large student email list of various majors was obtained and used to invite participants 
to take part in a 10-minute study, which they could access via hyperlink.  The study had to be 
completed during a specified and randomly assigned one-hour time slot indicated in the email 
invitation.  Random assignment to a gain/loss framing condition was also done ex ante.  
Participants were offered entry into a drawing for a cash prize of $100 (9 a.m. – 11p.m. time 
slots) or $300 (midnight - 8 a.m. time slots) in return for their participation.  Our sample was 
derived only from those who responded to our invitation.  The survey software program recorded THOUGHTFUL DAYS AND VALENCED NIGHTS 8 
 
start and completion times for each participant.  This same recruitment took place across two 
semesters, with prize drawings at the end of each semester. 
   Upon accessing the online survey, participants were first presented with informed 
consent, followed by several demographic questions.  Afterwards, they were presented with our 
measure of circadian rhythm, the reduced Horne and Östberg (rH&D).  The rH&D is a shortened 
version of the Horne and Östberg (1976) inventory and has been shown to have good validity 
(Adan & Almirall, 1991).  The rH&D was followed by questions accessing recent sleep levels 
and caffeine consumption.  Next, participants were presented with the Asian disease problem 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) followed by a risk-free and risky alternative; both alternatives 
were framed either positively or negatively.   Participants were then asked to rate their preference 
toward the alternatives on a 7-point scale from “Definitely would recommend Program A” to 
“Definitely would recommend Program B”.  After making their choice, participants were asked 
several remaining questions and then thanked for participating. 
Results 
  
  In our initial examination, we tested for evidence of the framing effect for all participants 
across the 24-hour assigned times.  This analysis revealed the typical framing effect F (1,668) = 
47, p< .001 and the data are presented in Table 1.  Because of the temporal variability in the 
presentation of our data, we next observed participants circadian typology.  Consistent with the 
literature examining young adult samples (Chelminski, Petros, Plaud & Ferraro, 2000) , we found 
the percentage of morning types in our was very low, with less than 1 percent of our sample 
meeting the “moderate” or “definite” morning type criteria.  Given the low percentage, we THOUGHTFUL DAYS AND VALENCED NIGHTS 9 
 
excluded morning types from further analysis and focused on the majority of our university 
sample.   
  To examine our primary circadian-match hypothesis, we first needed to divide the 24-
hour cycle into “on” and “off” times for evening types.  To accomplish this we relied on previous 
research (e.g., Dı´az-Morales, & Sa´nchez-Lo´pez, 2005; Smith, et al., 2002).  This research 
shows the following on-times for evening types (9:00 a.m. - 1:59 p.m., 5:00 p.m. - 1:59 a.m.), 
daily off times (2:00 a.m. – 8:59 a.m.), and siesta off-time (2:00 p.m.-4:59 p.m.).  The average 
risk response across frame and circadian match/mismatch for participants is reported in Table 2.  
Analysis of all participants revealed a significant main effect for framing F (1, 666) = 47.1, p < 
.001 as well as the predicted circadian match by frame interaction F (1, 666) = 4.7, p < .04
1.   
Discussion 
  The findings from our study provide support for the overall robustness of framing effects 
across the 24-hour day and also reveal a diurnal pattern of risk responding that depicts a 
predictable pattern for strength in framing effects across the 24-hour cycle.  Our predictions were 
based in the dual-process view in social psychology (e.g., Chaiken, 1987; Petty & Cacioppo, 
1986), suggesting that when motivation and ability are high people process with  more effortful 
processing whereas when motivation and ability are low, people process with less effortful 
processing. 
  Consistent with prior research on circadian rhythms, we predicted that during on-times 
motivation and ability would be heightened, leading individuals to process the decision task with 
more effortful processing whereas during off-times motivation and ability should be lessened, 
leading to less effortful processing.  In conjunction with prior research investigating effortful THOUGHTFUL DAYS AND VALENCED NIGHTS 10 
 
processing and framing effects (e.g., Biswas, 2009; Leny-Meyers & Maheswaran, 2004; 
McElroy & Seta, 2003; McElroy & Mascari, 2007), we further predicted that during circadian 
off-time hours, the less effortful processing should lead to stronger framing effects.  Conversely, 
during on-times the more effortful processing should attenuate framing effects.  Our findings 
supported this hypothesis and also provide further support for dual-process views in judgment 
and decision making.  
  Our findings show a predictable pattern for the strength of the framing effect, something 
that many researchers in the area have called for in earlier investigations (e.g., Kühberger, 1998; 
Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998).  Our findings also provide evidence for daily variations in the 
strength of the framing effect, a variable that should be of interest to those investigating the 
framing effect. 
  Future research should examine variables that may interact with daily variations in 
circadian rhythm.  For example, it seems prudent to examine whether variables that could elicit 
high levels of arousal (Cheng & Chiou, 2008; Fagley & Miller, 1997; McElroy & Seta, 2006; 
Miller & Fagley, 1991; Wang, Simons, & Bredart, 2001; Wang, 2006) may attenuate or override 
the circadian rhythm effects.  This type of investigation should further the understanding and 
knowledge of framing effects. 
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1 a.m.     19      3.3      15  4 
2 a.m.     15  3.1     12  4.7    
3 a.m.     15  2.9     11  4.4 
4 a.m.     15  3.3     10  4.5 
5 a.m.     2  3.5     13  4.5 
6 a.m.     8  4.5     11  4.6 
7 a.m.     13  3.6     10  4.3 
8 a.m.     18  3.1     12  4.8 
9 a.m.     10  3.8     12  3.8 
10 a.m.     20  3.6     17  4.1 
11 a.m.     17  3.2     17  3.7 
12 p.m.     15  2.9     8  5.1 
1 p.m.     16  3.2     1  4.4 
2 p.m.     22  3.7     1  5.3 
3 p.m.     17  3.7     17  4.7 
4 p.m.     16  3.1     20  5.1 
5 p.m.     16  2.8     21  4.3 
6 p.m.     12  4.8     11  4.6 
7 p.m.     21  3.4     11  3.9 
8 p.m.     8  3.8     11  3.5 
9 p.m.     12  4.3     13  4.4 
10 p.m.     10  2.9     6  5.5 
11 p.m.     14  4.3     17  4.1 
12 a.m.     19  3.1     11  4.3 









Off times     141  3.4     133  4.7 
     
 






1 We also performed an analysis using only participants who were classified as “moderate” or 
“strong” evening types.  This analysis revealed a similar pattern of data with a main effect for 
circadian match F (1, 312) = 4.1 p< .05, frame F (1, 312) = 24.7 p< .001 and a frame by 
circadian match interaction F (1, 312) = 3.3 p< .08. 
 